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The broadening scope of the federal power over interstate
commerce is nowhere more significantly illustrated than in the
widespread movement for a federal child labor law.
The significance of the movement lies in the fact that it is
an attempt to bring federal aid to the cure of what has become
largely a federal problem. For it appears that the opposition to
any improved child labor legislation in the States has come to be
based largely upon the cry that legislation State by State is unfair; that it is unjust to expect the manufacturers of one State
to compete with the manufacturers of an adjoining State with a
totally different standard of child labor; that if the States are
to advance, they should advance together. The argument reminds Congress that it is from the federal Constitution that every
manufacturer is guaranteed the right to ship his goods freely into
whatever State he pleases, provided only that they are merchantable and may be safely transported. Under the Constitution no
State may lift a ban against the products of another Sfate, whatever unequal advantage their manufacturer may have enjoyed,
or from whatever inhuman working conditions his product may
have sprung. The federal government enjoys this power in the
case of imports-and has exercised it, for instance in the con(487)
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vict labor clause of the tariff ;--but not so the States themselves,
who have parted with the power. There was a day when this
was otherwise. But it was an evil day. It has been called the
critical period of American history. The States could then lay
embargoes and commercial prohibitions as they pleased. And it
was largely due to the evils which attended the lodging of this
particular power in so many sovereignties that the Constitution
was adopted, in which, for the good of all it was surrendered to
one. Where fhe hands of the States are tied the power of the
federal government must be invoked for the benefit of all.
Passing, however, as beyond the scope of this discussion,
the economic relation of such legislation to the problem of interstate competition and interstate commerce, let us ask and
seek to answer the single question, is it constitutional?
To approach this problem as directly as possible, and to
avoid retracing ground already traveled, let us pass at once to
the point of furthest clearly established authority, as found in
the decisions on the federal Lottery and Food and Drugs Acts.
The constitutionality of both of these acts is beyond question.
The former has been tried and found abundantly justified in an
elaborate decision by the Supreme Court.' The latter has been
frequently sustained in the lower courts, 2 and its constitutionality has been tacitly assumed in several cases involving its construction, before the Supreme Court. 3
From these decisions we note two incontrovertible conclusions; first, that lottery tickets and misbranded and adulterated
goods are articles of commerce; and, second, that regulation of
interstate commerce in these articles may take the form of prohibition.
Do these conclusions support a federal law to prohibit interstate commerce in the products of child labor? If so, what are
the limits of the power?
That there is a distinction between the two acts -cited, and
those earlier acts which sought to prohibit the carriage of articles
1188 U. S. 321

(1903).

79 Fed. Rep 517; 18i Fed. Rep. 629; i8o Fed. Rep. 518; 175 Fed. Rep.
299; 179 Fed. Rep. 985.
'Hipolite Egg Co. v. U. S., 220 U. S. 45 (1910); U. S. v. Johnson, 221
U. S. 488 (191o); U. S. v. Lexington Mill Co., 232 U. S. 398 (1913).
2
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likely to endanger commerce itself, as for instance nitro-glycerine
or loose hay or other combustible materials, is obvious. In these
acts the prohibition was designed primarily to protect the people
from dangers incident to the physical carriage itself. In the two
later acts relating to lotteries and adulterated and misbranded
food products, however (as also in the case of those various
other acts relating to falsely-branded dairy products and condemned carcasses of animals, and quarantined articles and obscene literature), it is obvious that the courts which sustained
them have passed beyond the consideration of a danger to commerce inherent in the articles, and have looked to a possible injury to the public resulting from the future use of the articles
by the consumer, after commerce has been terminated. The use
of lottery tickets is calculated, in the judgment of Congress, to
debauch the public morals. The circulation in commerce of misbranded and adulterated goods is calculated to deceive and injure the people who use such goods.
The single question, then, which presents itself is this: Can
a controlling distinction be drawn between a power in Congress
to prohibit the interstate transportation of articles adapted to deceive or defraud the consumer, or injure his health or morals,
and articles whose manufacture has injured the health and morals of the children employed therein? In other words, may
Congress look forward to the effect of such articles upon the
consumer for whose benefit they are produced, but not backward
to the effect of their manufacture upon the worker and the industry by which they are made?
In answering this question, it is important to remember at
the outset that we are concerned solely with the problem as to
whether the proposed legislation is or is not a regulation of interstate commerce, within the meaning of the Constitution. If it
is a regulation (and does not violate some specially protected
right under the Constitution) it is constitutional. If not, it is
not constitutional, and the question as to whether it incidentally
affects the conditions of manufacture in a given State-conditions over which Congress itself has no primary right of control-is altogether beside the point.
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We repeat that there is need to emphasize this point, for the
argument that it is in effect an invasion of the police powers of
the States is at the bottom of all the opposition which has been
made to such legislation. This argument has been nowhere more
aptly stated than by President Taft, who in a few sentences, in
his recent little volume on Popular Government, attacks the
proposed bill, and sums up his argument in these words:
"In other words, it seeks indirectly, and by duress, to
compel the States to pass a certain kind of legislation, that is
completely within their discretion to enact or not."
With a sincerity of respect for the decisions of this great
judge which is born of a personal study of every judicial decision which bears his name-the writer submits that this statement and the conclusion based upon it, are both erroneous. The
bill does not compel the States-does not invite the States-to
pass any legislation. It concerns itself only with legislation by
Congress, and only with that phase of commerce which is under
the sole jurisdiction of the federal government. In so far as
it is true that this legislation may indirectly affect conditions in
the States, this is wholly beside the question now presented, as
is clear from a simple reference to the acts above referred to.
For instance, so far as creating a national standard is concerned,
what possible distinction can be drawn between the indirect effect
of the Food and Drugs Act in establishing a national standard
for food and drugs, and the indirect effect of the proposed federal Child Labor Bill?
The argument, then, looks to an incidental effect that ignores the inherent nature of the law as a prohibitory commerce
act, and reminds us forcibly of the language of the Supreme
Court in the first White Slave Case, 4 in reply to the contention
that the Mann Act was "a subterfuge and an attempt to interfere with the police power of the States to regulate the morals
of their citizens," and in consequence an invasion of the reserved
powers of the States. Says the Court, in the language of Mr.
Justice McKenna:
'227

U.

S. 308, 321, 322 (913).
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"There is unquestionably a control in the States over the
morals of their citizens, and, it may be admitted, it extends
to making prostitution a crime. It is a control, however, which
can be exercised only within the jurisdiction of the States, but
there is a domain which the States cannot reach and over which
Congress alone has power; and if such power be exerted to
control what the States cannot it is an argument for-not
against-its legality. Its exertion does not encroach upon the
jurisdiction of the States. We have cited examples; others
may be adduced. The Pure Food and Drugs Act is a conspicuous instance. In all of the instances a clash of national
legislation with the power of the States was urged, and in
all rejected.
"Our dual form of government has its perplexities, State
and Nation having different spheres of jurisdiction, as we have
said, but it must be kept in mind that we are one people; and
the powers reserved to the States and those conferred on the
Nation are adapted to be exercised, whether independently or
concurrently, to promote the general welfare, material and
moral."
This distinction has been even more clearly emphasized by
one of the most distinguished authorities on constitutional and
administrative law in the United States, Prof. Frank J. Goodnow, of Columbia University, now constitutional adviser of the
Chinese Government and President-elect of Johns Hopkins University, in a small but notable volume entitled "Social Reform
and the Constitution," in which he unequivocably declares in
favor of the proposed legislation. After referring to the provision of the Constitution that the laws of Congress made in pursuance of the Constitution shall be the supreme law of the land,
Prof. Goodnow remarks:
"Men's minds are peculiarly twisted when they argue, under a constitution containing such a provision, that a regulation
purporting to be a regulation of interstate commerce is not
such because it will necessarily have the incidental effect
The only reason
of regulating conditions of manufacture.
why it will have this incidental effect is because in the
economic conditions of the present day manufacturing has
ceased to be a State, and has become an interstate matter. A State with no factory legislation can, in the present conditions of interstate transportation, underbid a State
which seriously attempts to improve the conditions of manufacturing. The denial by the Federal Government of the
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right of the States to protect their laboring population against
competition based on cheaper and lower conditions of labor,
really makes it incumbent on the Federal Government to exercise its constitutional powers to the fullest extent in the interest of the laboring classes, which the States can no longer protect."
To return, then, to the question raised upon the decisions
above noted, the inquiry presents itself as follows:
Is thdre a substantial distinction in principle between an act
of Congress which regulates interstate commerce in an article
with respect to certain qualities likely to affect the consumer, and
an act which regulates commerce in articles with respect to the
effect which the manufacture of such articles has had upon industry and the labor employed therein; in other words, is the
protection of industry-the conservation and protection of its
labor and the equalization of interstate competition through interstate commerce-a proper subject in whose interest may be
enlisted the interstate commerce power of the Constitution?
For a categorical denial of the existence of any such distinction let me quote from a recent tmpublished article by Prof. W.
W. Willoughby, of Johns Hopkins University, lately president
of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, and,
like Prof. Goodnow, one of the leading authorities in the country
upon constitutional and administrative law. In an earlier treatise upon constitutional law Prof. Willoughby expressed a doubt
as to the constitutionality of the legislation now proposed. In
the article to which I refer, however, he presents in no uncertain
terms his later conclusion in its support:
"The distinction between conditions of production and
purposes, or modes of use, of commodities, though a real one
will probably not be held controlling. In neither case has Congress a direct regulative power-over neither the conditions of
production nor the mode or use of consumption. If, therefore, in either case, the prohibition can be construed to be, in
fact, a regulation of interstate or of foreign commerce, neither
the ultimate effect nor the legislative intent embodied in the
law may be inquired into by the courts. In result, then, it is
to be admitted that the lottery case is authority for the doctrine
that interstate carriers may be prohibited from carrying, or
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shippers or manufacturers from sending, from State to State,
and to foreign countries, commodities produced under conditions so objectionable as to be subject to control as to their
manufacture by the States, under an exercise of their police
powers or of a character designed or appropriate for a use
which might similarly be forbidden by law."
Is this conclusion correct? Does the protection of industry
-the protection of the manufacturer and the protection of the
worker who produces these articles of commerce-fall within
the rightful function of the interstate commerce power of the
Constitution?
With this precise question before us, in the light of what I
have said, let me invite consideration to certain propositions
which have an important bearing upon the interpretation of this
clause.
The power of which we are speaking is to be found in some
twenty-one words of the Federal Constitution, as follows:5
"The Congress shall have power * * * to regulate
commerce with foreign nations and among the several States
and with the Indian tribes."
As will be seen, three powers are here included in a single
sentence, of which the power which we are now considering appears as second among the number.
Obviously there is nothing in the wording of this clause to
suggest a distinction between power to regulate commerce with
foreign nations and the power to regulate commerce among the
several States, and, as a matter of fact, it has been repeatedly
declared that, so far as the phrase above referred to is concerned,
the power is identical.
Said Mr. Chief Justice Marshall in Gibbons v. Ogden," that
landmark on the interstate commerce clause:
" * * * the power over commerce with foreign nations and among the several States is vested in Congress as
absolutely as it would be in a single government having in its
constitution the same restrictions in the exercise of the power
as are found in the Constitution of the United States."
'Article I, §7.
'9 Wheaton, I, 194 (824).
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7
Mr. Justice Johnson remarked in the same case:

"The power to regulate foreign commerce is given in the
same words and in the same breath, as it were, with that over
the commerce of the States, and with the Indian tribes, but the
language which grants the power as to one description of commerce, grants it to all; and, in fact, if ever the exercise of a
right or acquiescence in a construction could be inferred from
contemporaneous and continued assent, it is that of the exclusive effect of this grant."
Said Mr. Justice Taney in the License Cases: 8
"The power to regulate commerce among the several States
is granted to Congress in the same clause, and by the same
words, as the power to regulate commerce with foreign nations;
and coextensive with it."
Said Mr. Justice Matthews, in Bowman v. Chicago & North
Western Railway Co. :'
"A power conferred upon Congress to regulate commerce
among the States is indeed contained in the same clause of the
Constitution which confers upon it power to regulate commerce
with foreign nations. The grant is conceived in the same terms
and the two powers are undoubtedly of the same class and
character, and equally extensive."
Said Mr. Justice Bradley in Brown v. Houston: 0
"The power to regulate commerce among the several States
is granted to Congress in terms as absolute as is the power to
regulate commerce with foreign nations."

And in Crutcher v. Kentucky: 1"
"It has frequently been laid down by this court that the
power of Congress over interstate commerce is as absolute as
it is over foreign commerce."
And after pointing out that the power of Congress includes
the duty of providing for the security of the people of the United
States-in relation to foreign corporate bodies, and foreign indi'

9

Wheaton, 228 (1824).

a 5 Howard, 504, 578 (1847).
125 U. S. 465, 482 (1888).
0114 U. S. 622, 630 (885).
"1 141

U. S. 47, 58 (189i).
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viduals with whom they may have relations of foreign commerce, he continued:
"And the same thing is exactly true with regard to interstate commerce as it is with regard to foreign commerce. No
difference is perceivable between the two."
So, too, in an earlier case, in the Circuit Court, 12 before his
appointment to the Supreme Court, he said:
"WNe think that the power of Congress is supreme over the
whole subject, unimpeded and unembarrassed by State lines
or State laws; that in this matter the country is one, and the
work to be accomplished is national; and that State interests,
State jealousies, and State prejudices do not require to be consuited. In matters of foreign and interstate commerce there
are no States."
Said Mr. Justice Field, in Pittsburgh & Southern Coal Co.
v. Bates:13
"The power to regulate commerce among the several States
is granted to Congress in terms as absolute as is the power to
regulate commerce with foreign nations."
Said Judge Davis, in United States v. Forty-three Gallons
of Whisky:

14

"Congress now has the exclusive, the absolute power to regulate commerce with the Indian tribes, a power as broad and as
free from restrictions as that to regulate commerce with foreign
countries."
Finally we may quote again from Professor Willoughby:
"It is believed, therefore, that so far as the grant contained in the commerce clause is concerned, no valid distinction
between interstate and foreign commerce can be drawn."
The above quotations are sufficient to establish the substantial identity of the powers over foreign and over interstate commerce.
The next proposition to which I would call attention is that
the power thus established in a single phrase of the Constitu1Stockton v. Baltimore & New York Rwy. Co.,

is 156 U. S. 577, 587 (i895).
id3 Otto, x88 (1876).

32

Fed. Rep. 9, I7 (1887).
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tion has been frequently exercised in the form of prohibition for
the protection of the commerce and industry of the nation. The

justification of the embargo under the commerce clause is a conspicuous example. As before, we have the authority of Mr. Chief
Justice Marshall, who said, in Gibbons v. Ogden,"5 in discussing
the power of Congress under the commerce clause:
"The universally acknowledged power of the Government
to impose embargoes must also be considered as showing that
all Arinerica is united in that construction which comprehends
navigation in the word commerce. Gentlemen have said, in argument, that this is a branch of the war-making power, and
that an embargo is an instrument of war, not a regulation of
trade. That it may be, and often is, used as an instrument of
war, can not be denied, but not all embargoes are of this description. They are sometimes resorted to without a view to
war, and with a single view to commerce. When Congress imposed that embargo which, for a time, engaged the attention of
every man in the United States, the avowed object of the law
was the protection of commerce and the avoiding of war."
To the same effect is the language of Mr. Justice Daniel,
speaking for the Supreme Court in United States v. Mangold: 6
"Since the passage of the embargo and nonintercourse
laws, and the repeated judicial sanctions those statutes have
received it can scarcely, in this day, be open to doubt that every
subject falling within legitimate sphere of the commerce regulation may be partially or wholly excluded, when either measure shall be demanded by the safety or by the importance of
the interests of the Nation."
So, too, Judge Davis, of the United States district for Massachusetts, in the case of United States v. William, 17 in which he
sustained the constitutionality of the recent embargo act:
"Further, the power to regulate commerce is not to be confined to the adoption of measures exclusively beneficial to commerce itself, or tending to its advancement, but in our national
system, as in all modern sovereignties, it is also to be considered
as an instrument for other purposes of general policy and interest.')
"Supra, n. 6.

'9How.56o (185o).

"2'8 Fed. Cases, 614 (1808).
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The greatest of all commentators on the Constitution, Justice Joseph Story,"' wrote:
"Foreign and domestic intercourse has been universally
understood to be within the national power. How, otherwise,
could our theory of prohibition and nonintercourse be defended?
From what other source has been derived the power of laying
embargoes in a time of peace and without any reference to war
or its operations? Yet this power has been universally admitted to be constitutional, even in times of the highest political
excitement."
In Gibbons v. Ogden,'9 in demonstrating that the power to
regulate commerce included the regulation of vessels employed
in transporting passengers, Judge Marshall emphasized his conclusions by pointing out that it was clearly recognized by the
framers of the Constitution that the power to regulate included
the power to prohibit, for the reason that they inserted an express exception to such power in the article forbidding Congress
to prohibit the importation of slaves until i8o8:
"This section has always been considered as an exception
from the power to regulate commerce, and so far as an exception from a power proves its existence, this section proves that
the power to regulate commerce applies equally to the regulation of vessels employed in transportating men who pass from
place to place, voluntarily, and to those who pass involuntarily."
In a scholarly essay, The Commercial Power of Congress,
Mr. David Walter Brown, of the New York Bar, thus summarizes the activities of the early Congresses in pursuance of the
commerce power, and comments on an alleged distinction between the power over foreign and interstate commerce:
"The policy of restriction included measures of two kinds:
(i)the prohibition of the importation of foreign commodities
and of the entry of foreign vessels into our ports; and (2) embargoes upon commerce. They illustrate, upon a grand scale
and in a drastic manner, the application of the commercial
power of Congress to the attainment of'great national ends.
through restrictions placed upon various branches of trade, and
extending even to total prohibition; and in so far as the precedents furnished by them are authoritative, they indicate the
"3 Vol. 2, page io6o (Edition of 1833).

"Supra, n. 6.
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unsoundness of the view that the power of Congress to regulate commerce is restricted to the passing of measures to advance it, but stops short of the power to prohibit it * * *
"Attempts have been made to distinguish between the
power to impose restrictions and embargoes upon foreign and
upon interstate commerce, the former power being admitted,
the latter denied; but the distinction is not supported by the
text of the Constitution, nor by the decisions of the Supreme
Court; and, as we shall see more clearly in the chapter which
considers the embargo laws of Jefferson's administration, it
was not recognized by him."
If, then, the power to regulate commerce between the States
is identical with the power to regulate foreign commerce, it is
submitted that the same moving considerations for the protection of commerce and industry which have directed the action
of Congress in regard to foreign commerce must be permitted to
apply also to commerce between the States. In other words
(subject to the limitation hereafter discussed), the power to regulate interstate commerce may be exercised-and exercised to
the point of prohibition-for the protection of the industries of
the Nation so far as those industries are directly affected in the
exercise of that power.
The identity which has been emphasized above, however, is
not meant to suggest that the power of Congress over foreign
commerce, is not, by reason of certain other constitutional
grants, broader than the power over commerce between the
States. In the case of foreign commerce there are no State
rights to be considered. Where Congress might prohibit the
importation of merchandise from certain countries, it could obviously not discriminate, in interstate commerce, between the
States. So far, however, as no such special circumstance or
limitation suggests itself, the powers may be considered together
and as identical.
This conclusion at once invites the question-May exclusion
be arbitrary? If not, what are the limits of Congressional power,
and does the same rule apply to both interstate and foreign commerce?
The reply to the inquiry is two-fold: (i) that it has never
yet been squarely decided, and is at least a question of serious
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doubt, whether Congress may arbitrarilyprohibit the introduction of any articles into the United States; and (2), that even if
such a broad power must be conceded in the case of foreign commerce, any such assumption of arbitrary power in the case of
foreign commerce must yield to the restrictions of the due process
clause, in the case of commerce between the States.
Probably the broadest statement of the power of Congress
over foreign commerce is found in the case of Butterfield v.
Stranahan,2 0 where the Supreme Court, in sustaining the right
of Congress to prohibit the importation of inferior teas, reminds
us that Congress has, from the beginning, exercised a plenary
power in the exclusion of merchandise brought from foreign
couatries, both by embargoes and prohibitory tariffs, and has
also "in other tariff legislation asserted a police power over foreign commerce by provisions which in and of themselves
amounted to the assertion of the right to exclude merchandise
at discretion," illustrating this statement by the laws regulating
the degree of strength of drugs and chemicals entitled to admission to the United States.
In this case, however, it is to be noted, that the facts of the
case itself and of the cases cited in the opinion are very far from
supporting an arbitrary discretion.
That no such arbitrary discretion exists either as to foreign
or as to interstate commerce is the view of Professor Willoughby,
who states his conclusions as follows in the article above referred
to:
"The question as to the extent to which Congress is limited by the due process of law requirement when exercising the
power granted it by the commerce clause, is one not wholly
free from difficulty, but this much at least is clear, that Congress may not, under the guise of an exercise of its commerce
power, any more than it may under the guise of any of its
other powers, work a direct deprivation of a particular property right or a direct impairment of a specific contract right.
From this it follows that, granting that an individual has a
vested right to engage in interstate or foreign commerce, he
can not be arbitrarily excluded therefrom, either as a shipper or
so192 U.

S. 470 (1904).
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carrier or importer, except in so far as such exclusion may
fairly be held to be incidental to the regulation of such commerce."
Apart, however, from the question of foreign commerce, the
Supreme Court has expressly declared that the power to regulate
interstate commerce is not arbitrary, but is subject to possible
restrictions arising out of the Fifth Amendment, and otherwise
from the Constitution. This position has best been stated by the
Supreme Court in the Lottery Case 21 as follows:
"It is said, however, that the principle that in order to
suppress lotteries carried on through interstate commerce. Congress may arbitrarily exclude from commerce among the
States any article, commodity, or thing, of whatever kind or
nature, or however useful or valuable, which it may choose,
no matter with what motive, to declare shall not be carried
from one State to another. It will be time enough to consider the constitutionality of such legislation when we must
do so. The present case does not require the court to declare
the full extent of the power that Congress may exercise in the
regulation of commerce among the States. We may, however,
repeat, in this connection, what the court has heretofore said,
that the power of Congress to regulate commerce among the
States, although plenary, can not be deemed arbitrary, since it
is subject to such limitations or restrictions as are prescribed by
the Constitution.. This power, therefore, may not be exercised
so as to infringe rights secured or protected by that instrument. It would not be difficult to imagine legislation that
would be justly liable to such an objection as that stated and be
hostile to the objects for the accomplishment of which Congress
was invested with the general power to regulate commerce
among the several States.
"But, as often said, the possible abuse of a power is not.
an argument against its existence. There is probably no governmental power that may not be exerted to the injury of the
public. If what is done by Congress is manifestly in excess
of the powers granted to it, then upon the courts will rest the
duty of adjudging that its action is neither legal nor binding
upon the people. But if what Congress does is within the limits
of its power and is simply unwise or injurious, the remedy is
that suggested by Chief Justice Marshall, in Gibbons v.
Ogden, when he said:
"The wisdom and the discretion of Congress, their identity with the people, and the influence which their constituents
' Supra,

n. i.
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possess at elections are in this, as in many other instances, as
that, or example, of declaring war, the sole restraints on which
they have relied to secure them from its abuse. They are the
restraints on which the people must often rely solely in all representative governments."
The true solution of the problem-a solution which avoids
the dangers pointed out in the citation above, is, in the judgment
of the writer, correctly summarized in the following conclusions
presented to the Supreme Court by Mr. James M. Beck in his,
successful argument for the government in the Lottery Cases:
"The power to prohibit exists for any purpose referable
to the legitimate objects of government, such as the preservation
of health, the protection of morals, and the safety of life.
"It is not essential, however, for the Government to contend for an absolute power of prohibition, and it may well be
that where a prohibition is not referable to some of the police
powers of a sovereign State, or to the great aims for which all
government is founded, and where therefore such prohibition is
an undue tresspass upon the liberties of the citizens, that the
judicial department of the Government would have the power
to declare such a law void. The bill of rights contained in the
amendments to the Constitution may well prohibit many arbitrary and unwarranted prohibitions of trade between the
States."
This statement is in effect the same as that presented by
Prof. Willoughby in the following language:
"In result, then, it is to be admitted that the lottery case
is authority for the doctrine that interstate carriers may be
prohibited from carrying or shippers or manufacturers from
sending from State to State and to foreign countries commodities produced under conditions so objectionable as to be subject to control, as to their manufacture, by the States under an
exercise of their police powers or of a character designed or
appropriate for a use which might similarly be forbidden by
law."
This police power test calls to mind at once the recent utterances of the Supreme Court in the White Slave Cases. In the
first of these 22 Mr. Justice McKenna, speaking for a unanimous
court in sustaining the White Slave Act, used this language:
"Hoke

v. U. S.,

227

U. S. 308, 323 (1913).
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"The principle established by the cases is the simple one,
when rid of conftising and distracting considerations, that
Congress has power over transportation 'among the several
States'; that the power is complete in itself, and that Congress, as an incident to it, may adopt not only means necessary but convenient to its exercise, and the means may have
the quality of police regulations.
Gloucester Ferry Co. v.
Pennsylvania, 114 U. S. 196, 215; Cooley, Constitutional Limitations, 7th ed. 856. We have no hesitation, therefore, in pronouncing the act of June 25, 191o, a legal exercise of the power
of Congress."

This declaration was repeated by Mr. Justice Pitney in the
later of these cases, 23 in which after declaring that the prohibition of the act is not confined to transportation, supported this
conclusion as follows:
"As has already been decided, it has the quality of a police regulation, although enacted in the exercise of the power
to regulate interstate commerce (Hoke v. United States, 227
U. S. 308, 323; Gloucester Ferry Co. v. Pennsylvania, 114 U.
S. 196, 217) ; and since this power is complete in itself, it was
discretionary with Congress whether the prohibition should
be extended to transportation by others than common carriers."
The test above suggested clearly avoids the constitutional
objection pointed out by the Supreme Court in the language
quoted from the Lottery Case, as also the obvious dilemma of
the argument ad absurdum-which proved so fatal to Senator
Beveridge during the course of his speech in 1907, in which he
courageously defended the contention that the power was arbitrary-andthat its exercise was wholly a matter of policy, never
one of power.
In conclusion, then, it is submitted that if it is true that "the
power of Congress over interstate commerce is as absolute as it
is over foreign commerce," and that a prohibition on the importation of convict-made goods is a valid exercise, not of the taxing power but of the power to regulate commerce; if it is true
that Congress has in its tariff acts, prohibitory or otherwise,
avowedly had in mind the protection of the manufacturer and
Wilson v. U. S., 232 U. S. 563, 567 (Feb. 24, 1914).
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the artisan; if it is tfile that the power to regulate crnn-ce as
stated by Justice Marshall, "is complete in itself, may be ekercised to its utmost extent, arid acknowledges no lifrlitations other
than are prescribed in the Constitution"; arid if it is true, as
the Stiprehie Couft declares in the White Slave Case, that "if the
facility of interstate transportation can be taken away from the
demoralization of lotteries, the debasement of obscene literature,
the contagion of diseased cattle or persons) the ihIpUtity of food
and drugs," it can also be taken from "'the enslavement iii piostittitioin and debahchery of women, and, more insistently of girls "
-surely it may equally be denied to a commerce which arises lit
and thrives upon conditions of child employment which Congress
coltceives to be a menace to the general welfare of the Nation
Stich legislatioti is not all attempt to impose a fedefal standard ttpon the internal affairs of any State. It is merely a declaration that the channels of Interstate commerce shall hot be polluted by being used to support a condition of child slavery shocking to the moral sense of the people. It is a regulation of the
commerce between the States.
Jasper Yeates Brinton.
Philadelphia.

